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FAITH-BASED ORGANISATIONS, 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE  
WORLD BANK
Jeffrey Haynes
Abstract
Faith-based organisations (FBOs) have increasingly become important actors 
in international development cooperation. Many international institutions 
recognise them as valuable partners and declare to have ‘mainstreamed 
faith’ within their own activities. But is this really the case? And how has this 
happened? Focusing on the activities of the World Bank in the 1995–2005 
period, when, under the leadership of President James Wolfensohn and 
Katherine Marshall, then Head of the Bank’s Development Dialogue on Values 
and Ethics (DDVE), the institution engaged with some selected FBOs, this 
chapter enquires into the reasons for the Bank’s interest in faith as well as 
its sudden disappearance. It argues that the main rationale for engagement 
with faith lay in the disappointing results of previous secular strategies 
and the feeling that religion had a positive role to play in fighting poverty. 
However, diverging perceptions of poverty and development between states 
and religious entities, along with lingering suspicions among state officials 
about dealing with faith in the public realm, derailed the collaboration.
1. Introduction
Faith-based organisations (FBOs) are now widely recognised as important actors 
in development in much of the developing world.1 The importance of FBOs 
comes in the context of three linked yet conceptually distinct developments: 
widespread religious resurgence, especially in the developing world; deepening 
globalisation; and extensive popular and donor concern with consistently 
disappointing development outcomes in many developing countries and 
1 There is no generally accepted definition of an FBO. FBOs are, however, generally characterised as having one or more 
of the following qualities: affiliation with a religious body; a mission statement with explicit reference to religious values; 
financial support from religious sources; and/or a governance structure where selection of board members or staff is based 
on religious beliefs or affiliation; and/or decision-making processes based on religious values. This definition is derived 
from Ferris (2005, 312).
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regions (Haynes, 2007a, 2007b). Against this background, the announcement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 was a concrete attempt 
to demonstrate the capacity of the international community to improve 
development outcomes in the developing world. 
There are two generic kinds of FBOs active in development: (1) FBOs that 
are active in only one country, and (2) FBOs that act transnationally, that is, in 
more than one country. All developmentally-oriented FBOs share a common 
desire to help produce better development outcomes, sometimes by seeking to 
influence policy formation and execution at the national or international level. 
Due to the potentially vast nature of the subject matter, it is not possible in this 
brief chapter to examine each and every area where FBOs have an impact on 
development. Similarly, this chapter is not state- or region-specific. Instead, I 
offer an introduction to the topic by way of a brief overview and short analysis of 
how and with what effects selected FBOs have interacted in the recent past with 
the largest and most important secular development agency, the World Bank. 
I examine two questions in this chapter. First, why did the World Bank 
seek to engage with selected FBOs, including the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), in pursuit of improved development for a decade beginning in the 
mid-1990s? Second, why did the Bank’s enthusiasm wane in the mid-2000s 
and then, for all practical purposes, fade away? To address these questions, I 
focus on the troubled relationship between the World Bank and the WCC and 
offer an explanation as to why this once burgeoning relationship seems to have 
declined in recent years. At a more general level, the Bank today appears to 
eschew consistent, regular or institutionalised relations with FBOs, including 
the WCC. 
In order to contextualise the discussion, the chapter starts by briefly outlining 
the evolution of approaches to development in the post-war era. The second 
section focuses on the role of selected FBOs, including the WCC, in the formation 
of the MDGs. In the third section, I examine the World Bank’s short alliance 
in the 1990s and early 2000s with various FBOs, including both the WCC and 
the Anglican Church. This occurred during the tenure of James Wolfensohn, 
president of the Bank for a decade between 1995 and 2005, which coincided 
with a period of strong interest in the developmental potential of FBOs. I assess 
whether the focus of the Bank on FBOs during this time was due primarily to 
the personal interest of Wolfensohn, or whether faith has had a longer term 
and continuing impact on programming at the Bank. In other words, was faith 
‘mainstreamed’ in its activities, as the Bank now claims, leading to discernible 
and continuing ‘traces’ of faith in the Bank’s development-focused activities?
2. Failed strategies to achieve improved development 
after World War II
The ideological power of neoliberalism was at its zenith in 1989–91 when 
the Cold War came to an end and the Eastern European communist bloc 
spectacularly and swiftly collapsed. The rapid disintegration of Europe’s 
communist governments not only appeared to offer clear evidence of the 
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superiority of capitalism and liberal democracy over communism, but also 
provided pro-market forces with ideological momentum. The then-dominant 
neoliberal development strategy – the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ – 
reflected the pre-eminence of these ideas among key, Washington DC-based, 
opinion-leaders, including: ‘the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the 
World Bank, independent think-tanks, the US government policy community, 
investment bankers, and so on’ (Thomas and Reader, 2001, 79). However, 
critics of the Washington consensus argued that the studiously pro-market 
view it endorsed gave insufficient emphasis to the essential developmental 
role of the state, the only institution with the power and authority to alter 
prevailing socioeconomic realities through application of appropriate policies 
and programmes. It also neglected developmentally important non-state actors 
– including both secular and faith-based organisations – that are also influential 
in delivering improved human development (Taylor 2005). 
The focus on non-state actors in relation to development goals reflected the 
abject failure of many post-World War II development strategies. After 50 years 
of state-led development policies and programmes, and a quarter-century of 
neoliberal economic policies – championed both by the Bank and the IMF – the 
developmental picture in the 1990s was gloomy, characterised by rising global 
poverty and polarising inequality. The statistics of developmental failure at 
the end of the twentieth century were damning: over 1 billion people in the 
developing world lived on less than US$1 a day. More than 2 billion people 
– nearly a third of the total global population – did not have access to clean 
drinking water. In addition, hundreds of millions of individuals lacked even 
basic health care and/or educational opportunities (World Bank, 2001). 
Over the six decades since the end of World War II, there were three stages 
of thought regarding development. First, during the 1950s and 1960s, when 
dozens of culturally, politically and economically disparate post-colonial 
countries emerged, mainly in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, the West’s chosen 
development strategy was primarily the application of appropriate levels of 
state-directed development aid. Second, during the 1970s, substantial increases 
in the price of oil both underlined and hastened developmental polarisation, with 
some richer developing countries – such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
– managing to better cope than their poorer counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa 
and elsewhere. Many developing countries also found their international debt 
quickly rising. At the time, the West’s development programme followed a ‘basic 
needs’ strategy. It was envisaged that development goals would be achieved via 
a strategy to ensure that all people had access to necessary ‘basics’, including: 
clean water, basic health care and at least primary education. This strategy 
generally failed, however, for two main reasons: first, ‘development’ became 
subsumed within the wider Cold War ideological division, with government-
disbursed development funds often going not to the most ‘developmentally 
deserving’ countries but instead to key allies; and, second, ruling elites and 
their supporters in many developing countries were frequently unwilling to 
facilitate the necessary financial transfers upon which the successful delivery 
of the basic needs strategy fundamentally hinged (Haynes, 2005, 2007a; Taylor, 
2005; Shaw, 2005). 
Proof
IDP2013_05_chap04   51 06/12/2012   16:11
  52 
International Development Policy
Finally, the third phase followed in the 1980s. Increasing developmental 
polarisation galvanised Western attempts to encourage poorer developing 
countries to reform their economic policies to improve development outcomes. 
Western governments, led by the United States, Britain and (West) Germany, 
and international development agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF, 
concurred that in the developing world, ‘unacceptable’ levels of state meddling, 
incompetence and poor policies often fatally undermined the achievement 
of development goals. Their proposed solution was to ‘roll back’ the state, 
believing that governments had often ‘tried to do too much’, expending much 
effort and money but achieving little. Instead, private entrepreneurs would, it 
was envisaged, provide new injections of dynamism, energy and funding to 
address development shortfalls, usefully augmenting the state’s developmental 
role. In pursuit of this strategy, Western financial assistance pivoted on 
‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs) in dozens of developing countries. 
According to Barber Conable, World Bank president between 1986 and 1991, the 
implementation of SAPs reflected the World Bank’s belief that ‘market forces and 
economic efficiency were the best way to achieve the kind of growth which is 
the best antidote to poverty’ (Conable quoted in Thomas and Reader, 2001, 79). 
Conable’s statement reflected the then-current intellectual predominance 
of neoliberalism in development thinking. Neoliberalism was an economic 
and political philosophy that ideologically underpinned the pro-market and 
monetarist ideas of various Western governments, including those of Britain’s 
Margaret Thatcher (1979–90), Germany’s Helmut Kohl (1982–98) and, in 
the US, the administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981–89) and George H. W. 
Bush (1989–93). A core belief of neoliberalism was that to achieve desirable 
development outcomes, the role of government must be diminished, ‘freeing’ 
private capitalists and entrepreneurs from state control to apply their energies 
to economic growth strategies. Under pressure from Western governments and 
key international financial institutions – especially the World Bank and the IMF 
– the governments of many developing countries were strongly encouraged to 
develop and implement neoliberal policies. Outcomes, however, were on the 
whole disappointing in terms of reducing developmental inequalities (Stiglitz, 
2006). Correspondingly, there was then a rethinking of strategy involving the 
United Nations and its key development agency, the World Bank, and, to an 
extent, the IMF. This rethinking suggested that, after decades of development 
failures, it was time to come up with a new approach, involving new actors, 
strategies and programmes.
3. FBOs and the Millennium Development Goals:  
a change of approach
Development disappointments encouraged the international community to 
announce a third millennium ‘onslaught’ on poverty and human deprivation, 
with efforts particularly focused on sub-Saharan Africa, the region with most 
pronounced and widespread exigencies. The result was the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration (UNMD). The purpose of the UNMD was to finally 
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comprehensively deal with human deprivation and poverty, in the world’s 
most underdeveloped countries and regions.2 The MDGs were announced in 
September 2000, with a 15-year timeline for achieving eight primary goals: 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; 
promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; 
improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 
ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for 
development (United Nations, 2010). 
The MDGs strategy was not unique in its designation of clear goals and 
a specified timeframe for achievement. What was new was that the MDGs 
were premised upon the assumption that to attain desired outcomes across 
the developing world it would be appropriate and welcome for both state 
and non-state actors – secular and faith-based – to work together (Haynes, 
2007a ; Lunn, 2009; Haar, 2011). At this time, the world’s wealthiest and most 
influential development agency, the World Bank, publicly accepted the need for 
refocusing of developmental emphasis if these development goals were to be 
widely achieved. The Bank noted in its World Development Report 2000/2001 
that adjustments were necessary at both global and national levels. While the 
Bank did not specifically mention faith-based organisations in the 2000/2001 
Report, their relevance may be inferred from its recommendations, which stated 
that to achieve improved developmental outcomes it was necessary to employ all 
currently under-used human resources – which would include those potentially 
available from FBOs – especially at the grassroots level where ‘real’ development 
gains would be recorded.
It is important to note that the recognition of the potential of FBOs by 
the World Bank and the Development Industry more generally, in achieving 
improved development was unexpected. As Lunn (2009, 937) notes, ‘religion, 
spirituality and faith have suffered from long-term and systematic neglect in 
development theory, policy making and practice, although there has been a 
noticeable turnover in the past 10 years’. One important reason for this change 
in thinking is linked to the wide-ranging impact of the Cold War and subsequent 
developments. These include the changing international context following the 
end of the Cold War, deepening globalisation, the impact of 9/11, and assorted 
global financial crises. A result of these multiple and multifaceted global changes 
was to reanimate thinking about development outcomes in the developing world 
and, by extension, the role of FBOs in this context. 
It should be noted that it was once widely assumed that nations would 
invariably secularise as they became ‘modern’. This assumption of the inevitable 
decline of religion dovetails with the modern, Enlightenment-derived belief 
that science and technological development would eventually overcome the 
perennial social problems of poverty, environmental degradation, hunger and 
disease, resulting in long-term human progress. As such, it is plausible to 
surmise that lack of success in this regard was one of the factors behind the 
recent increased focus on the developmental role of religion in the developing 
world (Berger 1999). Instead, contrary to the claims of secularisation theory, faith 
has had an increasing impact upon development outcomes in many parts of the 
2 The full Millennium Declaration is at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
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developing world (Haynes, 2007a; Lunn, 2009; Mesbahuddin, 2010). This is not 
to imply that faith has ‘only’ impacted upon development. It has also affected 
other – once thought to be primarily ‘secular’ – areas of human endeavour. 
First, religion is often used politically as a vehicle of opposition or an ideology 
of community self-interest. Threats emanating from either powerful, outsider 
groups or unwelcome symptoms of modernisation (such as the breakdown 
of ‘moral’ behaviour and perceived over-liberalisation in education and 
social habits) may serve to galvanise such communities. Second, the failure 
of governments to consolidate programmes of developmental improvement 
has also encouraged religious entities to take action, including the creation of 
specific faith-based agendas of solidarity and development. Examples of such 
initiatives include the Roman Catholic Basic Christian Communities found in 
Latin America and Africa, and various Islamic development entities throughout 
much of the Muslim world.
The end result is that growing numbers of FBOs now seek to involve 
themselves in areas that were long believed to be inherently secular areas of 
human activity, including development, politics and social issues (Alkire, 2006; 
Holenstein, 2005; Marshall, 2005a, 2005b; Haynes, 2007a; Rees, 2009; ter Haar, 
2011). Today, in many countries and regions of the developing world, FBOs work 
to help to deliver improved human development, including improved social 
services for people whom national or local governments cannot or will not assist 
sufficiently. Some service-oriented FBOs in the Middle East and sub-Saharan 
Africa enjoy annual budgets that may exceed those of agencies officially 
tasked by the state to deliver general social welfare (Ellis and ter Haar, 2004; 
ter Haar, 2011). It is not the case, however, that the work undertaken by FBOs 
necessarily unproblematically complements that performed by relevant secular 
state agencies. Alkire (2006) emphasises that the understandings of desirable 
development outcomes expressed by FBO leaders may differ significantly from 
those advanced by secular economic development models, including those of 
the World Bank. From a religious perspective, secular development programmes 
and policies – which prioritise increases in measurable, material development 
outcomes as their main objective – are ‘one-eyed giants’. This is because secular 
development models ‘analyse, prescribe and act as if man could live by bread 
alone, as if human destiny could be stripped to its material dimensions alone’ 
(Goulet, 1980, quoted in Alkire, 2006, emphasis in original). 
Such concerns are reflected in the views of those whose ideas derive 
from specific religious perspectives. For example, writing from an Islamic 
viewpoint, Seyyed Hossein Nasr focuses on the link between modernisation 
and development, emphasising that to be meaningful, ‘development’ must have 
a strong spiritual dimension. For Nasr, ‘development’ without spirituality is a 
fatal distraction, distancing Muslims from their true religious/spiritual nature, 
and at best delivering development concerned only with material outcomes 
(Nasr 1967, 1975, 1996).
 
Roman Catholic social teachings, to provide an 
additional example, have also articulated a faith-based view of development. 
This emphasises the contributions of ‘spiritual disciplines and of ethical action 
to a person’s “vocation to human fulfilment”, addressed alongside contributions 
made by markets, public policy, and poverty reduction’ (Alkire, 2006, 10). 
Another Roman Catholic perspective, liberation theology, regards structural 
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developmental and political injustices to be remediable through popular 
engagement by Roman Catholics with political and economic institutions to 
try to achieve better outcomes for the less fortunate. A Peruvian priest, Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, famously articulated liberation theology in his 1971 book, A Theology 
of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation. Finally, other religious faiths, 
including Judaism and Buddhism, have also advanced development interpre-
tations akin to that of Gutierrez, collectively underlining that the world faiths 
(Buddhism, Christianism, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism) all perceive the issues 
of human development rather similarly. Distinctive ‘liberation theologies’ have 
been articulated in both Judaism and Buddhism, among world faiths. Various 
popular books have explicated similar people-centred, faith-based, development 
perspectives (see, for example, Kliksberg, 2003, and Sivaraksa, 1993; for an 
overview, see Marshall, 2011). 
Views of development from faith-based perspectives, on the one hand, and 
secular ones, on the other, have not traditionally seen eye to eye. Of course, 
this is not surprising when we consider that conventional (secular) approaches 
to development have been devised by (secular) Western policy makers for 
many, including strategic, reasons. For much of the history of international 
development, there was no recognition that when secular policy-makers 
try to make policy for religious peoples, they are likely to fail. Recently, as 
Mesbahuddin (2010) notes, attempts have been made ‘to restore some of 
that imbalance by incorporating cultural issues and religious values into the 
international development policy network, but hostilities remain’, leading to 
several policy problems. First, Western (secular) development policies and 
practices continue to be articulated within a predominantly neoliberal and 
secular framework which necessarily curtails the input from other ideological 
viewpoints, including faith-based perspectives. Second, within developing 
countries there may be hostility from government towards including religious 
actors in development policy discussions. Finally, there are often divisions 
between and within faith communities within states, making it difficult to 
develop faith-focused development models which are inclusive and do not 
serve to reinforce pre-existing social and religious divisions. 
4. The World Bank, faith and development 
During the second half of the 1990s, the then-president of the World Bank, 
James Wolfensohn, emerged as a champion of increasing the role of FBOs in 
development policies and programmes. Wolfensohn saw failure to involve 
FBOs in development as irrational, given their great importance to many people 
in the developing world. Additionally, this movement towards the inclusion 
of FBOs came at a time when, in the furore following the implementation 
of SAPs, the Bank was actively seeking to engage with civil society and 
allay criticism that the Bank was not willing to listen to voices from below 
(interview with senior World Bank official, 23 January 2012). The increased 
attentiveness to FBOs did not stem from any particular religiosity on the part 
of the Australian Wolfensohn – who is a non-practising Jew – but rather a 
from largely instrumental recognition of a previously missed opportunity to 
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harness potentially productive resources for improved development outcomes. 
For Wolfensohn, faith could play an important role in development in two 
main ways: 
•	 Bottom	up	pressure	on	policy	makers	and	consequential	 influence	on	
policy formation. This could occur by engendering and/or influencing 
policy-makers’ values and outlooks, in turn affecting the formulation of 
specific development policies; and
•	 Bringing	together	or	dividing	communities	along	faith	lines. This could either 
ameliorate or worsen pre-existing social and/or political conflicts centring 
on access to improved development opportunities.
The second bullet point suggests that Wolfensohn did not believe that 
building three-way relationships between governments, secular development 
agencies and FBOs would be unproblematic. Yet he saw the involvement of 
FBOs in development as rational for the following reasons: 
•	 FBOs	of	various	kinds	–	including	churches,	mosques,	religious	charities	
and religious movements – are important aspects of civil society in most 
developing countries. Their involvement in development policies and 
programmes could potentially help achieve improved development. 
•	 FBOs	already	play	a	key	role	in	providing	education	and	welfare	in	many	
developing countries, so it seems logical to involve them in development 
issues and outcomes.
•	 FBOs	may	share	many	values.	Coming	together	in	pursuit	of	development	
could help not only to achieve improved development outcomes but also 
assist religious/cultural understanding in developing countries. 
For Wolfensohn, 
[t]his is a powerful idea – to tap the strengths of religions as development 
actors. Consider economics, finance and administration as disciplines that are 
deeply ethical at the core…they are about poverty reduction and employment 
creation. A vision without a task is boring. A task without a vision is awfully 
frustrating. A vision with a task can change the world. (World Bank, 2012)
During his 1995–2005 presidency of the Bank, Wolfensohn was the driving 
force behind the establishment of various initiatives with FBOs, which began 
with the building of a relationship with the Geneva-based World Council of 
Churches (WCC).3 Wolfensohn also created two World Bank faith-focused 
entities in 1998: the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD)4 and the 
3 The WCC was founded in Amsterdam in 1948. It is an international, interdenominational Christian organisation which 
brings together around 350 Protestant, Anglican and Eastern Orthodox Churches. WCC headquarters are in Geneva. 
4 According to the WFDD website, ‘The World Faiths Development Dialogue was set up in 1998 as an initiative of James 
D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank and Lord Carey, then Archbishop of Canterbury. Its aim is to facilitate a dialogue 
on poverty and development among people from different religions and between them and the international development 
institutions. The focus is on the relationship between faith and development and how this is expressed, both in considering 
decisions about development policy and in action with impoverished communities all over the world’ (WFDD, 2012).
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DDVE.5 Following initial informal discussions, the Bank’s formal dialogue 
with the WCC began in early 2002, with a meeting in Accra, Ghana, which 
also involved the IMF, and continued until August 2008. Since then, however, 
no further three-way meetings have taken place between the organisations 
and, at the current time, none are planned (WCC, 2004). The WCC was very 
sceptical about the desirability of establishing dialogue with the World Bank, 
with ‘far-ranging reservations about the motivations, governance structures, 
policies, and programs of the Bretton Woods institutions’, including the World 
Bank (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007, 196; Mshana, 2001). 
A four-day meeting held in Canterbury, England, in July 2002 highlighted 
the problems inherent to the attempt to develop fruitful relationships between 
governments, secular development agencies and FBOs in pursuit of improved 
development outcomes. Jointly led for the Bank by Wolfensohn and for the 
global Anglican Church by its then-head, Archbishop George Carey, the meeting 
brought together individuals from 15 developing countries, including faith 
participants. The director of the WFDD, Michael Taylor, led the consultation. 
World Bank representatives were among the observers at the meeting; the IMF 
was also invited to participate in the event, but due to scheduling conflicts no 
representative was able to be present. The meeting’s main purpose was to gain 
an initial understanding of how FBOs could make their views on development 
consistently known to the Bank and the IMF, and how this information could 
be factored into policies and programmes, particularly in relation to poverty 
reduction strategies in the developing world (WFDD, 2003). In addition, the 
meeting also focused on a range of human development issues, including the 
potential for FBOs to help more generally to improve development outcomes. 
The gathering brought together an impressive group of religious leaders, key 
development organisations and individuals from the secular private sector, 
including the worlds of entertainment and philanthropy. Discussions and 
presentations at the meeting focused on key development problems identified 
in the Millennium Declaration, including education, poverty, HIV/AIDS, 
gender, conflict and social justice. Participants discussed various dimensions 
and developmental ramifications of globalisation, including its differential 
impact on rich and poor countries. Participants noted that poverty, HIV/AIDS, 
conflict, gender concerns, international trade and global political issues link 
all the world’s countries and peoples. This not only highlighted the existence 
of a global community in an abstract sense but also more practically the 
importance of shared responsibility and partnership in fighting the collective 
problems facing humanity. The overall conclusion of the meeting was that more 
needed to be done to move from expressions of solidarity to the realisation of 
practical programmes and policies through collaboration between FBOs, secular 
development agencies, and governments (Marshall and Keough, 2004). 
Several faith participants emphasised that not only is poverty a complex 
phenomenon, but also that many people regard the achievement of freedom and 
5 The DDVE was a small unit at the World Bank whose purpose was to contribute to analytical work, capacity development 
and dialogue on issues related to values and ethics. Founded in 2000, for the next decade the DDVE served as the World 
Bank’s focal point on the intersection of religion and development. In addition, the unit led a number of projects related 
to prominent development issues, such as the current economic crisis in Africa, with a focus on the difficult distributional 
trade-offs faced by various development actors in dealing with these issues. The DDVE was disbanded in July 2011 without 
replacement (DDVE, 2011).
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a satisfying life as a higher priority than simple gains in income or improvements 
in social indicators (Marshall and Keough, 2004). For example, according to a 
Sri Lankan at the meeting, aspirations of Buddhist Sri Lankans differ from those 
of people in secular Western countries who are, according to him, singularly 
focused on economic growth. The Sri Lankan commented that in his country 
‘The middle path, path to the human liberation in Buddhism, guides people 
for a simple, happy and content life’ (Tyndale, 2004; also see Marshall, 2011). 
In addition, two African participants highlighted that in popular perceptions 
of relative importance, opportunities in life can rival wealth acquisition. A 
Tanzanian underlined the significance of rights in alleviating poverty, especially 
social well-being, as well as those related to security, justice, freedom, peace, 
and law and order. In relation to Zambia, a speaker claimed that opposition 
parties were weak and ‘only the [Catholic] Church speaks out’. More generally, 
Catholic social teaching was said to be a key source of inspiration for many 
Zambians,6 with its focus on human dignity particularly important in contrast 
to the view that ‘economic growth equals development’ tout	court. The Zambian 
participant also stressed that ‘if growth does not benefit the human being, then 
it is not development at all’ (Tyndale, 2004).
Between 2000 and 2006, Dr. Katherine Marshall was head of the DDVE, 
serving as Wolfensohn’s right-hand woman in relation to faith issues.7 According 
to Marshall (2005b), the Bank did not believe ‘that religion and socio-economic 
development belong to different spheres and are best cast in separate roles – 
even separate dramas’. Her observation was based on the Bank’s recognition 
that many religious organisations and secular development agencies have 
similar key concerns, including the improvement of (1) the lot of materially 
poor people; (2) the societal position of those suffering from social exclusion 
and; (3) unfulfilled human potential in the context of glaring developmental 
polarisation within and between countries. In other words, while faith was 
once understood as ‘otherworldly’ and ‘world-denying’, there was growing 
agreement between the World Bank and other secular financial organisations, 
including the IMF, that increasing cooperation with faith-based organisations 
could usefully contribute to the achievement of developmental goals, not least 
because issues of social and economic justice are central to the teachings of the 
world religions (interview with former senior IMF employee, 30 January 2012). 
This burgeoning consensus was reflected during Wolfensohn’s presidency in 
a major Bank initiative, ‘Shaping the Agenda – Faith & Development’, which 
was characterised by three main areas of ‘faith’ dialogue: (1) Building bridges 
- stronger, bolder partnerships (2) Exploring a more ‘comprehensive’, ‘holistic’ 
and ‘integrated’ vision of development, and (3) Transforming dialogue into 
6 A 1996 amendment to the constitution declared Zambia a Christian nation while also providing for freedom of religion. 
About 85 per cent of Zambians are Christian; 5 per cent Muslim; 5 per cent subscribe to other faiths, including Hinduism, 
Baha’ism, and traditional indigenous religions; and 5 per cent profess no religious faith. 
7 Currently a visiting professor at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, Katherine Marshall served as senior advisor for 
the World Bank on issues of faith and development. Working for the Bank between 1971 and 2006, Marshall was involved 
over the years in many Bank task forces and issues, among them exercises addressing leadership issues, conflict resolution, 
the role of women, and issues for values and ethics. Earlier in 1997–98, she had led the Bank’s work on social policy and 
governance during the East Asia financial crisis years, while also working extensively on Eastern Africa and Latina America. 
From 2000 to 2006 her mandate covered ethics, values, and faith in development work, as counsellor to the World Bank’s 
then president, James Wolfensohn.
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practice and action (Word Bank, 2012; interviews with former and current 
senior World Bank employees, 25, 26 and 27 January 2012). 
In addition to these World Bank initiatives, several other United Nations 
agencies were also developing dialogue with FBOs at this time. The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the IMF each began a dialogue with the WCC. An 
affiliate of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), started 
an initiative entitled ‘Social Capital, Ethics, and Development’. In this context, 
the IDB ‘approached religious leaders to try to win the backing of their moral 
authority…for its campaign in Latin America against corruption’ (Tyndale, 2004, 
2). In addition, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) sought to build 
links with various religious leaders, including Muslim imams, in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Bangladesh (UNFPA, 2004). The UNFPA also collaborated more 
widely with religious leaders in sub-Saharan Africa via a dialogue characterised 
by sensitivity and respect, facilitating the implementation of educational 
programmes and programmes for women’s empowerment. Overall, as Tyndale 
notes, such collaborations became possible when both ‘sides’ – that is, secular 
development agencies and FBOs – accepted that alone, neither had the entire 
solution to development quandaries (2004, 6). The broader point is thus that 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, several UN agencies began to take faith 
engagement seriously, and sought to build relationships with faith leaders in 
developing countries.
Despite this development within the UN, the building of functional 
relationships with faith-related and mainstream policy entities within the Bank 
did not develop according to Wolfensohn’s pro-faith focus. This was partly 
due to the strong secularist bias within the top echelons of the Bank, which 
meant that few – if any – senior Bank officials openly support the pro-faith 
initiatives, and partly because it was difficult to be clear as to how faith would 
factor into development policies and programmes in a concrete and practical 
sense. Many Bank operatives believed that faith issues are inherently divisive, 
frequently leading to complications and strife within developing countries. 
Conventional wisdom in the Bank was, and is, that serving humanity and 
improving development outcomes is most likely to be achieved through 
secular development vehicles (interviews with former and current senior World 
Bank employees, 25, 26 and 27 January 2012). This scepticism significantly 
undermined the chances of developing and institutionalising Bank-FBO 
dialogue and initiatives. While existing research is not yet definitive on the 
issue, preliminary and anecdotal findings indicate that similar processes 
occurred at the IMF, and perhaps other UN agency initiatives, which tended to 
slow down, diminish, or even halt, development of functional relations with 
FBOs (Marshall, 2005a, 2009; Haynes, 2007a; ter Haar, 2011; interview with 
former senior advisor to ex-IMF chief, Michel Camdessus, 24 January 2012). 
FBOs faced particular challenges in integrating their perspectives not only 
into the policies of the Bank and IMF, but also into pro-development activities 
at the level of civil society more generally. This point can be illustrated through 
the identification of various problems that surfaced in the early 2000s when 
trying to institutionalise relations between, on the one hand, governments, the 
World Bank and the IMF and, on the other, assorted faith leaders. A focal point 
in this regard was a joint World Bank/IMF initiative, the Poverty Reduction 
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Strategy Papers (PRSP), introduced formally in 1999 in the buildup to the 
Millennium Declaration of 2000 to try to cope with the poverty ramifications 
of bank-endorsed reform programmes. The PRSP was an attempt, developed 
by the Bank, to guide growth and poverty reduction within explicit strategic 
frameworks tailored for each client country. The overall purpose of a PRSP was 
to outline a comprehensive strategy to encourage growth and reduce poverty 
in a given developing country, in order to aggregate different actors’ priorities 
and analyses under the general rubric of ‘development’ with the intention of 
increasing chances of complementarity and coherence. In pursuit of this goal, 
wide-ranging consultations with prominent figures and organisations were 
held in each affected country. Overall, PRSP consultations sought to (1) adopt 
‘economically rational’ growth and development strategies while (2) aiming 
to ensure that the resulting policies and programmes were compatible with 
what the population regarded as developmentally appropriate and sustainable. 
Once consultation was concluded, a PRSP would be finalised. The World Bank, 
informed by input from the IMF, would assess the strengths of the PRSP as the 
basis for a country to receive associated loans and credits (Levinsohn, 2003).
Civil society’s participation was seen as both essential and central to PRSP 
design, and some FBOs were recognised as potentially important factors in 
PRSP formulation and execution. That said, there was no coordinated strategy 
to engage FBOs in PRSP processes, nor necessarily wide-ranging discussions 
to ascertain their views and evaluate relevant experiences. This was due to the 
fact that while PRSP-related processes were conducted in consultation with the 
Bank, they were primarily designed and led by governments, many of which 
were openly reluctant actively or formally to seek FBO views. Thus, despite 
the fact that in each country adopting a PRSP selected FBOs were officially 
designated to be included in the consultation and participation process, their 
views were often sidelined (WFDD, 2003). This reluctance to engage with 
FBOs was also notable in a 2000 attempt, set in motion by James Wolfensohn, 
to institutionalise the involvement of FBOs in World Bank programmes and 
policies. Neither Wolfensohn nor Marshall expected the idea to be especially 
controversial, yet there was little overt support for the policy from the Bank’s 
Executive Committee (EC). While there is no truth to the claim that the idea 
was vetoed 24–0 by the EC (Rees, 2011), the lack of support for the initiative 
encouraged Wolfensohn to drop the idea (Marshall, 2005a; interview with former 
senior World Bank employee, 27 January 2012). 
It is possible to see the failure to adopt Wolfensohn’s proposal as the 
beginning of the end for the Bank’s formal development involvement with 
selected FBOs. Over the next decade, from the early 2000s to the present, 
the Bank showed diminishing enthusiasm for developing relationships with 
selected FBOs, including the WCC and the Anglican Church. This waning 
attention became clear as soon as Wolfensohn stepped down from the presidency 
in 2005. The next president, Paul Wolfowitz (2005–07), showed no interest 
whatsoever, nor did his successor, Robert Zoellick (2007–12). In addition, 
Wolfensohn’s vehicles to institutionalise and focus the Bank’s FBO-related 
efforts – the WFDD and the DDVE – began to lose importance once he stepped 
down, with the WFDD eventually hived off from the Bank in 2006. Led by the 
recently-retired Katherine Marshall, it has resurfaced as a non-governmental 
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organisation, based at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.8 The DDVE, 
under the direction of Quentin Wodon, was disbanded in 2011, leaving the 
Bank with no institutional interface with faith or FBOs. This does not imply, 
however, that if a government or World Bank country representative were to 
take the initiative, for operational reasons, to engage with a FBO, it would be 
forbidden (interview with senior World Bank employee, 2 February 2012). In 
addition, where FBOs are important long-term elements in civil society, such 
as in Zambia and Indonesia, for instance, as both highly religious countries, 
the continued involvement of FBOs would be seen as both appropriate and 
desirable (2 February 2012).The salient point of the foregoing discussion is 
that from the early 2000s, the perceived desirability of engaging formally and 
institutionally with FBOs as part of the Bank’s development strategy diminished 
considerably, to the eventual point of virtual non-existence. There were three 
main reasons for this:
•	 falling	support	within	the	Bank	for	engaging	with	FBOs	on	a	regularised	
basis;
•	 resistance	by	many	developed	country	governments	to	regularising	or	insti-
tutionalising involvement of FBOs in development, a concern shared by 
governments of many developing countries; and
•	 difficulties	of	reconciling	different	‘secular’	and	‘faith-based’	visions	of	
development in both theory and practice.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has explained that, from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, 
various secular development agencies, most notably the World Bank, but also the 
IMF, ILO, IDB and UNFPA, sought to engage with selected FBOs in the pursuit 
of improved development outcomes. This followed a collective realisation 
among UN agencies that secular and religious entities often share similar 
development concerns – particularly a commitment to poverty alleviation as 
a crucial first stage in reaching improved overall development outcomes, such 
as heightened respect for human rights. This common ground linked them to 
the growing consensus among UN agencies, many governments, and numerous 
civil society organisations in both developing and developed countries that 
led to the UN-sponsored Millennium Declaration and subsequent Millennium 
Development Goals. 
The main question I examined in this chapter was: Why did the World Bank 
seek to engage with selected FBOs in pursuit of improved development during 
the late 1990s, and why did this enthusiasm subsequently wane and then, for 
all intents and purposes, fade away? As I argued, an important, albeit general, 
reason for the Bank’s increased interest in the role of faith in development was 
that, after half a century, secular development policies and programmes had led 
to disappointing outcomes in many parts of the developing world. As a result, 
many senior figures at the Bank, especially the then-president, James Wolfensohn, 
8 See http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd.
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believed that something new and different should be tried to improve outcomes. 
Given that, at present, confidence in developing state governments seems to 
be declining while trust in religious leaders and organisations appears to be 
growing, it is likely that many people in the developing world now believe it 
to be entirely appropriate that FBOs should have a consistent and significant 
voice in development strategy. On the other hand, it is also very likely that most 
donor governments regard faith’s involvement in the public realm, including 
politics and development, with apprehension and/or suspicion. This perception 
is often linked to what they see as a more problematic general involvement of 
faith in the public realm. 
Additionally, there are marked differences in the perceptions of poverty 
and development of FBOs, on the one hand, and governments and secular 
international development agencies, such as the World Bank, on the other. 
That is, while governments and secular international development agencies 
still overwhelmingly prioritise economic growth in development, FBOs and 
their leaders often see things very differently. FBOs tend to emphasise a range 
of ways of understanding the concepts of poverty-reduction and development, 
including those informed by spiritual concerns, over and above the narrow 
achievement of higher incomes. The key practical question, then, is how, and in 
what ways, can the World Bank, IMF, and other secular development agencies, 
as well as governments, constructively integrate faith perspectives into poverty 
reduction strategies and pro-development policies? Or, to put it another way, 
how, and in what ways, can faith constructively influence the perspectives of 
governments and secular development agencies on poverty reduction strategies 
and, by extension, development? It is apparent, however, that this is going to be 
a difficult issue to resolve – not least because religions often do not view poverty 
reduction as the central question in the creation of more fulfilling, sustainable 
lifestyles. Instead, they afford the greatest importance to the achievement of 
wider spiritual and religious goals. 
Was the focus of the Bank on FBOs for the decade beginning in the mid-1990s 
due primarily to the personal interest of the then-president, James Wolfensohn, 
or has faith had a longer term and continuing impact on programming? In other 
words, are faith issues now ‘mainstreamed’ into its activities, as the Bank claims, 
leading to discernible and continuing ‘traces’ of faith in the Bank’s development 
strategies? The answer to this question is not clear. Certainly, during my research 
for this chapter, I did not find definitive evidence that the Bank now habitually 
incorporates faith-based concerns in relation to development outcomes within 
its general approach. On the other hand, it is equally unclear as to what evidence 
would be necessary to authoritatively demonstrate that faith is ‘mainstreamed’ 
in the Bank’s development activities. Further research is necessary to shed light 
on this important question.
Finally, it may be that both governments and, to an extent, secular development 
agencies, despite paying lip-service to the involvement of faith in development, 
either lack the ability or are simply uninterested in integrating alternative – 
including faith-based – perspectives into wider development programmes and 
policies, such as poverty reduction strategies. Over the years, this issue has 
often strained relationships and undermined confidence between international 
development agencies, including the World Bank, and faith actors, with secular 
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development agencies’ own biases adding a layer of complexity. This continues 
not only to curtail vigorous and constructive debate about poverty reduction, 
but also to stymie the development of comprehensive development programmes 
that can consistently draw on both secular and religious insights. 
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Interviews
Interviews on the topics discussed in this chapter were undertaken with current and former World 
Bank and IMF employees. All of those interviewed have had direct experience with faith issues 
and development during their time as employees of the World Bank or the IMF. Most were happy 
to have the interviews recorded. I provide a list of interviewees below. However, many interviewees 
were uncomfortable with being referred to by name in the chapter, or linked with specific ideas or 
comments. Consequently, I refer to interviewees in the text generically and anonymously. Finally, 
I contacted the WCC to ask for an interview regarding the issues raised in this chapter, but the 
WCC chose not to respond to my request.
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